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Expectations and promises…
Mark Pawlowski considers the recent case of  Thorner v Curtis,
which examines whether there has to be an express promise to
raise a proprietary estoppel claim
Mark Pawlowski is a 
barrister and professor of
property law at the
University of Greenwich
PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
A
lthough the modern approach is
to explain the doctrine of propri-
etary estoppel in terms of the
general concept of ‘unconscionability’, it
is evident that a claim of this nature will
fail unless the court is satisfied that the
claimant has proven the three essential
elements of an assurance, reliance and
detriment. In Attorney-General of Hong
Kong v Humphreys Estate (Queen’s
Gardens) Ltd [1987], the Privy Council,
whilst recognising the trend away from
any strict application of rigid criteria in
this context towards a more flexible test
of unconscionability, nevertheless held
that all three elements of the estoppel had
to be satisfied. More recently, in Gillett v
Holt & anr [2000] Robert Walker LJ also
made clear that the doctrine should not
be subdivided into watertight compart-
ments (as the various elements of
assurance, reliance and detriment were
often intertwined) but that, for the sake of
clarity and convenience, it was still
appropriate for the court to conduct its
analysis by reference to the various com-
ponent parts of the claim. 
This approach is echoed in the most
recent ruling on the subject in Thorner v
Curtis & ors [2007], where Mr John
Randall QC (sitting as a deputy judge of
the High Court) emphasised that, despite
looking at each component separately, the
court must also stand back and look at the
claim in the round in order to decide
whether the conduct of the defendant had
given rise to an estoppel and, if so, what
should be the minimum equity necessary
to do justice to the claimant to avoid a dis-
proportionate result (see also Uglow v
Uglow & ors [2004]. The key issue in
Thorner, however, was whether, in a case
where an estoppel is raised so as to restrict
testamentary freedom of action, it was
necessary for the claimant to establish an
express promise (as opposed to merely an
expectation or belief) that they will
become entitled to some right or interest
in the land in question. It is this aspect of
the claim, therefore, which forms the basis
of this article.
Types of assurance
There is no doubt that an assurance may
take a variety of different forms. As was
indicated by Oliver J in Taylor Fashions
Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd
[1982], it may involve simply standing
by in silence whilst one party unwit-
tingly infringes the other’s legal rights:
see Salvation Army Trustee Co Ltd v West
Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council
[1981], which concerned conscious
silence. Alternatively, it may take the
form of active encouragement upon the
footing of some unilateral or shared
legal or factual supposition: see JT
Developments Ltd v Quinn [1991], which
concerned the encouraging of an expec-
tation of a new lease. As these cases
demonstrate, the range of conduct
which may qualify as a relevant assur-
ance is both wide and far-reaching.
It is now clear that an assurance may
be spelt out of an agreement which is
legally unenforceable for uncertainty of
terms. So, in Lim Teng Huan v Ang Swee
Chuan [1992] the agreement (which was
void for uncertainty) was nevertheless
held to constitute evidence of the parties’
intentions and it was to be inferred that
the claimant had completed the construc-
tion of the subject house in reliance on
that agreement (see also, more recently,
Cobbe v Yeomans Row Management Ltd
[2005] and Kinane v Mackie-Conteh [2005]).
It is also now well established that a
claim will not fail simply because the
right or interest to be secured has not been
precisely or expressly identified at the
time of the assurance. It is not, therefore, a
requirement that there be an expectation
‘Where the assurances
relied on fell significantly
short of express promises,
it is all the more
important for a claimant
to support their case with
clear and substantial
detrimental reliance and
corroborating evidence 
as to the meaning and
intention of the deceased’s
words or conduct.
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of some precise legal term. In Inwards v
Baker [1965], for example, the son had
spent money on building a bungalow on
his father’s land in the expectation,
induced by his father, that he would be
allowed to stay there as his home. The
father had said to his son: ‘Why don’t
you build the bungalow on my land and
make it a bit bigger?’ Interestingly, the
equity arising from the son’s expenditure
did not fail simply because the interest to
be secured had not been expressly indi-
cated by the father.
Vague assurances
In several cases the assurance relied upon
has been characterised as too vague or
uncertain to give rise to the claimant’s
expectation. A good example is Coombes v
Smith [1986], where an assurance given
by the defendant to his female cohabitee
that he would always ‘provide her with a
roof over her head’ was held insufficient
to constitute a representation that she
was legally entitled to security of tenure
against his wishes. Similarly, in Negus v
Bahouse [2008], HHJ Kaye QC (sitting as a
judge of the High Court) held that an
assurance by the deceased to the claimant
that if anything happened she would
‘have a roof over her head’ was insuffi-
cient to spell out a specific common
intention in respect of the deceased’s flat
so as to give rise to a constructive trust in
her favour. 
In Bennett v Bennett [1990] the Court
of Appeal held that a mere verbal state-
ment by the legal owner that he ‘didn’t
want [the claimant] out’ could not have
been reasonably understood by her as
an assurance that she could remain for
the rest of her life. The statement simply
suggested that the legal owner was pre-
pared to let her stay in the property for
the time being and that he would, there-
fore, have the right to ask her to leave
on reasonable notice. A similar conclu-
sion was reached in Bostock v Bryant
[1990], where the claimant was told by
her uncle: ‘Don’t worry about the
future, you’ll be alright.’ This was held
by the Court of Appeal to be too vague
to amount to an assurance that she
could live in the house as long as she
wished.
In Layton v Martin [1986] the
deceased, a married man, asked the
claimant to live with him, offering ‘what
emotional security I can give, plus finan-
cial security during my life and… after
my death’. In reliance on this statement,
the claimant provided various domestic
services until the deceased’s death. Her
claim for financial provision based on
proprietary estoppel was dismissed on
the ground that the deceased’s represen-
tations did not relate to any specific
assets. Scott J said:
A representation that ‘financial security’
would be provided… is not a representa-
tion that she is to have some equitable or
legal interest in any particular asset or
assets… What assets? His assets for the
time being, answered counsel for the
[claimant]. The proposition has only, in
my view, to be put to be seen to be
untenable.
As a general rule, therefore, although
absolute legal precision is not necessary,
the assurance made by the legal owner
must relate to some specific property or
to some part of the owner’s property.
This has been re-iterated in the more
recent case law, in particular Lissimore v
Downing [2003], where the court held
that unspecific statements made by the
defendant that ‘she [the claimant]
would never want for anything’, that
‘he would take care of her’, or ‘he had
looked after his other girlfriends and
she would not be different’ did not
found a proprietary estoppel. Such
statements were insufficient because
they were not expressed in terms which
enabled any objective assessment to be
made of what was being promised – see
also, most recently, James v Thomas
[2007], where the phrase ‘this will bene-
fit us both’ was held not to constitute a
promise of some property interest.
It is apparent, however, that propri-
etary estoppel is not limited to acts done
in reliance on a belief relating to an
existing right, but may extend to acts
done in reliance on a belief that future
rights will be granted: see Re Basham
(dec’d) [1986]. Accordingly, an estoppel
can be raised in relation to the grant of
rights over a residuary estate. This has
now, of course, been fully endorsed by
the Court of Appeal in Gillett v Holt. 
Curtis decision
The deceased owned a farm of substan-
tial value and also had considerable
savings. He made a will in 1997 leaving
the residue of his estate (including his
farm) to the claimant, but later revoked
the will and died intestate. From 1976
onwards, the claimant had worked
increasingly at the deceased’s farm for
no remuneration and by the 1980s had
come to hope that he might inherit the
farm. 
His claim, based on proprietary
estoppel, centred on various hints and
remarks which the deceased had made
over the years, which he argued led him
to believe that he was to inherit the
property. In 1990 the deceased had
handed the claimant a bonus notice
relating to two policies on the
deceased’s life saying that ‘that’s for my
death duties’. The claimant’s case was
that, at this point, his hope had matured
into an expectation of inheritance and
that, in reliance on that expectation, he
had acted to his detriment by working
on the farm. The main issue, therefore,
was whether there had to be an express
promise to found an action in estoppel.
The deputy judge reviewed a number
of authorities clearly pointing to the con-
clusion that an actual promise was not an
essential prerequisite to the benefit of a
proprietary estoppel. So, in Ramsden v
Dyson [1866] Lord Kingsdown made ref-
erence to a verbal agreement ‘or what
amounts to the same thing, an expecta-
tion, created or encouraged.’ In Taylor
Fashions Oliver J stated that proprietary
estoppel is aimed at:
… ascertaining whether, in particular indi-
vidual circumstances, it would be
unconscionable for a party to be permitted
to deny that which, knowingly, or unknow-
ingly, he has allowed or encouraged
another to assume to his detriment… 
In Gillett Robert Walker LJ referred to
cases where ‘the assurance is more than
a mere statement of present (revocable)
Proprietary estoppel is not limited to acts done in
reliance on a belief relating to an existing right, but
may extend to acts done in reliance on a belief that
future rights will be granted.
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[testamentary] intention, and is tanta-
mount to a promise’. Again, in Jennings
v Rice [2002] Robert Walker LJ (at para
44) added further that the cases
showed:
… a wide range of variation in both of
the main elements, that is the quality of
the assurances which give rise to the
claimant’s expectations and the extent of
the claimant’s detrimental reliance…
All these passages indicated that
there was no absolute requirement that
the assurance should necessarily
amount to an actual promise made in
terms as such. On the contrary, it was
apparent that the relevant representa-
tion could take the form of simple
encouragement in a belief (either, as
mentioned earlier, by words or conduct,
or passively – by remaining silent). In
the words of the deputy judge (at 
para 19):
The court must not allow itself to be tied
down with semantics – an assurance is an
assurance whether made expressly by
words spoken or written, or made by impli-
cation from words spoken or written or
from conduct. The ‘broad inquiry’ (as to the
ultimate question of unconscionability)
which the court must make in any such
case will include consideration of whether
assurances (or expectations encouraged)
by whatever means were indeed ‘tanta-
mount to’ promises.
The deputy judge, however, was also
keen to emphasise that, where the
assurances relied on fell significantly
short of express promises, it was all 
the more important for a claimant to
support their case with clear and 
substantial detrimental reliance and
corroborating evidence as to the mean-
ing and intention which the claimant
imputes to the deceased’s words or 
conduct.
In the instant case, the claimant’s
expectation that he would inherit the
farm was incremental and took place
over many years. At first, the claimant
had only a mere hope of inheritance,
which only later developed into an
expectation that he would inherit. This
was marked in 1990 by the handing
over of the bonus notice to the claimant,
indicating for the first time that the
deceased was intending that the
claimant should succeed to the farm.
Later, this expectation matured further
into what the deputy judge described
as, an ‘unspoken mutual understand-
ing’ between the parties. Looking at the
matter in the round, the deputy judge
had no hesitation in concluding that the
deceased’s words and conduct gave rise
to an estoppel in the claimant’s favour.
Moreover, the minimum equity to do
justice to the claimant (and avoid an
unconscionable result) was to award the
claimant the land and buildings, live
and dead stock and other chattels repre-
senting the deceased’s farm.
Conclusion for practitioners 
In Thorner there was strong corrobora-
tive evidence from various remarks 
and acknowledgements made by the
deceased himself that he intended to 
act in accordance with the claimant’s
expectations regarding inheritance of
the farm. 
In addition, it was abundantly
apparent that the claimant had engaged
in a huge amount of unpaid work at the
farm over many years in reliance on this
expectation. The handing over of the
bonus notice (with the deceased’s
accompanying remarks) was particu-
larly significant, as this strongly
encouraged the claimant to stay on at
the farm and continue his unpaid work
rather than pursue other opportunities
elsewhere. The case is therefore signifi-
cant because it highlights the need to
examine the various component ele-
ments of proprietary estoppel as an
entire package and not in isolation from
one another. 
As Robert Walker LJ observed in
Jennings, the doctrine ‘applies only if
these elements, in combination, make it
unconscionable for the person giving the
assurances… to go back on them’. ■
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